University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

9-2013

Accountability and Ideology: When Left Looks Right and Right
Looks Left
Philip E. Tetlock
University of Pennsylvania

Ferdinand M. Vieider
Shefali V. Patil
University of Pennsylvania

Adam Grant
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Organizational
Behavior and Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Tetlock, P. E., Vieider, F. M., Patil, S. V., & Grant, A. (2013). Accountability and Ideology: When Left Looks
Right and Right Looks Left. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 122 (1), 22-35.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.03.007

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/149
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Accountability and Ideology: When Left Looks Right and Right Looks Left
Abstract
Managers face hard choices between process and outcome systems of accountability in evaluating
employees, but little is known about how managers resolve them. Building on the premise that political
ideologies serve as uncertainty-reducing heuristics, two studies of working managers show that: (1)
conservatives prefer outcome accountability and liberals prefer process accountability in an unspecified
policy domain; (2) this split becomes more pronounced in a controversial domain (public schools) in
which the foreground value is educational efficiency but reverses direction in a controversial domain
(affirmative action) in which the foreground value is demographic equality; (3) managers who discover
employees have subverted their preferred system favor tinkering over switching to an alternative system;
(4) but bipartisan consensus arises when managers have clear evidence about employee trustworthiness
and the tightness of the causal links between employee effort and success. These findings shed light on
ideological and contextual factors that shape preferences for accountability systems.

Keywords
accountability, process, outcome, motivated reasoning, ideology, equality, efficiency, attribution errors,
trustworthiness

Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Organizational Behavior and Theory

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/149

RUNNING HEAD: Accountability and Ideology

Accountability and Ideology:
When Left Looks Right and Right Looks Left

Philip E. Tetlock
Leonore Annenberg University Professor
Department of Psychology and Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
tetlock@wharton.upenn.edu

Ferdinand M. Vieider
Risk & Development Group
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
fvieider@gmail.com

Shefali V. Patil
Doctoral Candidate, Management
Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
shefalip@wharton.upenn.edu

Adam M. Grant
Associate Professor of Management
Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
grantad@wharton.upenn.edu

Conditional Acceptance, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
(OBHDP-11-401R2)
Second revision

Accountability and Ideology

2

Abstract
Managers face hard choices between process and outcome systems of accountability in evaluating
employees, but little is known about how managers resolve them. Building on the premise that
political ideologies serve as uncertainty-reducing heuristics, two studies of working managers show
that: (1) conservatives prefer outcome accountability and liberals prefer process accountability in an
unspecified policy domain; (2) this split becomes more pronounced in a controversial domain
(public schools) in which the foreground value is educational efficiency but reverses direction in a
controversial domain (affirmative action) in which the foreground value is demographic equality;
(3) managers who discover employees have subverted their preferred system favor tinkering over
switching to an alternative system; (4) but bipartisan consensus arises when managers have clear
evidence about employee trustworthiness and the tightness of the causal links between employee
effort and success. These findings shed light on ideological and contextual factors that shape
preferences for accountability systems.

Key Words: accountability, process, outcome, motivated reasoning, ideology, equality, efficiency,
attribution errors, trustworthiness.
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“We let our people know what we want them to accomplish. But – and it is a very big but – we do
not tell them how to achieve these goals...By giving employees the freedom to find new paths to
new solutions, we are unleashing creativity.” – William E. Coyne, former senior vice president of
research and development, 3M (Coyne, 1997: 54)
“I hold them accountable to run the experiment, but not for the outcome of the experiment.” – KR
Sridhar, Chief Executive Officer of Bloom Energy (L. Wiseman, 2010: 84)
When organizations make flawed decisions, one rarely needs to wait long for those harmed
to demand “more accountability.” Commentators have identified accountability deficits as key
culprits behind British Petroleum’s environmental disaster (Kanter, 2010), the recent financial crisis
(Sorkin, 2009), corporate malfeasance at Enron, Arthur Andersen, and Worldcom (Frink &
Klimoski, 2004), medical errors (Sharpe, 2004), failures to anticipate national-security threats
(Posner, 2005), persistent inequities in employment decisions (Dobbs & Crano, 2001), and abuses
of power in global politics (R. W. Grant & Keohane, 2005).
It is, however, one thing to call for accountability—and quite another to choose the right
types of accountability to solve the problem at hand. A recurring debate in the sprawling research
literature on accountability is between proponents of process vs. outcome forms of accountability, a
debate that arises in such diverse domains as intelligence analysis (P.E. Tetlock & B.A. Mellers,
2011), public schools (Chubb & Moe, 1988), auditing (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, Peytcheva, &
Wright, 2011), sales-force management (Cravens, Ingram, LaForge, & Young, 1993), health care
(Rubin, Pronovost, & Diette, 2001), and business innovation (Coyne, 1997; Simons, 2005). Under
pure process accountability, employees expect to justify efforts and strategies used to generate
results. The focus is on inputs, not outcomes. Under pure outcome accountability, the focus flips:
employees expect to deliver tangible, end-state results, with little interest in explanations of how
they did it (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Curley, Yates, & Abrams, 1986).
Of course, few accountability systems fit either template perfectly. Managers often prefer
hybrid forms of accountability that blend process and outcome metrics in judging employees (P.E.
Tetlock & B.A. Mellers, 2011), perhaps because they recognize that each form of accountability has
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distinctive pros and cons. Research suggests that process accountability can encourage more
nuanced and normatively justifiable thought processes (Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; Siegel-Jacobs &
Yates, 1996; Simonson & Staw, 1992), but complying with process rules can be time-consuming
with no assurance of results and potential for inefficiencies (Edmondson, 1999). Outcome
accountability can encourage innovative methods of achieving goals (March & Simon, 1958;
Weick, 1979), but outcome metrics can send the tacit message “I don’t care how you get it done,”
winking at corner-cutting and gaming (Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004).
Given the importance of the decisions that managers make about process and outcome
accountability, it is critical to understand when and why managers prefer one form of accountability
over the other. Although little research has explored how managers choose among forms of
accountability, agency theorists have prescribed guidelines for how managers should make such
choices. For instance, when outcomes are uncertain—i.e., the correlation between agent effort and
work outcomes is tenuous—theorists recommend process contracts (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989; Ouchi,
1979). Coined the “controllability principle” in the accounting and performance management
literatures (Antle & Demski, 1988; Bouwens & Van Lent, 2007; Girud, Langevin, & Mendoza,
2008), the core idea is that employees should not be blamed for unfavorable outcomes—or credited
with favorable ones—that are due to uncontrollable causes. Doing so rewards the lucky, punishes
the unlucky (Adams, 1963; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Tyler, 1989), and triggers backlash
against perceived arbitrariness and unfairness (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994).
However sound such advice is in principle, it is difficult to implement. In complex,
knowledge-based workplaces, some uncertainty about the controllability of outcomes is inevitable
—a point documented in many settings, including health care, where hospital managers gauge how
variations in quality of care lead to variations in mortality rates (Mant, 2001); the pharmaceutical
industry, where managers judge the performance of R&D professionals trying to produce new
chemical compounds (NCCs) that yield “blockbuster” drugs (Cardinal, 2001; Henderson, 1994);
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and sales management, where even experienced managers misinterpret volatile time series, overattributing outcomes to effort and under-attributing them to task-difficulty confounds (e.g.,
variations in sales territories), in designing accountability systems (Mowen, Keith, Brown, &
Jackson, 1985).
To explore how managers make accountability decisions under uncertainty, we turn to
ideology as an organizing framework. Many scholars have suggested that ideologies provide
managers with psychological toolkits of heuristics that simplify decision making in stochastic
environments (Barley & Kunda, 1992; Blau & McKinley, 1979; Jackall, 1988; Kiesler & Sproull,
1982; McKinley, Mone, & Barker, 1998). We focus in particular on how political ideologies –
cognitive-affective blends of assumptions about human nature and prescriptions for how, and
through what means, society should be ordered (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Knight, 2006)–
provide managers with useful heuristics in coping with high-ambiguity, organizational-design
decisions (George, 1980; March, 2010; Tetlock, 2000). Ideologies do so by furnishing confident
answers to foundational ontological and ethical questions: Who can be trusted? How controllable
are bottom-line outcomes? Given that mistakes are inevitable, which mistakes should we try hardest
to avoid: failing to trust the trustworthy or trusting the untrustworthy, or treating the controllable as
uncontrollable or vice versa (Tetlock, 1998)?
To explore ideology-accountability linkages, we conducted two studies of working
managers. We begin by examining clashing accountability preferences in a high-ambiguity domain,
followed by two high-political-profile domains: the debates over the wisdom of holding publicschool teachers accountable for students’ standardized test scores (an outcome metric) and over the
wisdom of holding personnel managers accountable for minority advancement in key jobs (also an
outcome metric). Challenging the traditional trait view that ideologies lead to across-the-board
accountability preferences (e.g., Tetlock, 2000; Wilson, 1989), we work from the assumption that
managers’ preferences vary as a function of the answer to the time-honored political question:
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whose ox is being gored? In this view, managers are guided by what Sniderman et al. (1991) call the
likability heuristic. If the employees constitute a group toward whom managers of a certain
ideological persuasion have traditionally been skeptical, then managers will tend to support oftenseen-as-tough outcome metrics. If employees constitute a group toward whom managers have
traditionally been sympathetic, then managers will tend to support process metrics that protect
employees from being unfairly blamed for outcomes beyond their control.
Given the traditional political tensions between the public sector (especially teacher unions)
and conservatives (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2012; Chubb & Moe, 1990), this theoretical
analysis suggests that conservative managers will prefer outcome metrics for evaluating teachers—
and liberal managers will prefer process metrics. Conversely, given the traditional political affinity
between private-sector firms and conservatism, plus long-standing conservative skepticism of
affirmative action (Sniderman & Carmines, 1997), the same theoretical analysis predicts a reversal
of these preferences in applying equal employment opportunity laws to corporate America. Liberal
managers will now be supportive of outcome metrics for evaluating private-sector EEO compliance,
and conservative managers will be supportive of process metrics.
This analysis is also consistent with past work on ideological variation in value priorities,
which has repeatedly shown conservatives more likely than liberals to value efficiency over
equality (e.g., Baron, 2005; Tetlock, 1986). In the public school domain, supporters of
accountability for standardized test scores see it as an efficient mechanism for tracking children’s
learning and benchmarking quality of teaching, despite the inequities that such measures may
impose on teachers (Hanushek, 1986). In the EEO domain, supporters see numerical goals as
essential for ensuring equality for traditionally disadvantaged groups and for benchmarking EEO
compliance in personnel decisions, despite the inefficiencies and distortions that numerical goals
arguably inject into private-sector entities (e.g., Kittilson, 2005).
Building on theories of motivated reasoning we then extend our analysis to explore how

Accountability and Ideology

7

managers of varying persuasions react to evidence that their preferred accountability system has
malfunctioned—and that employees have found effective ways of circumventing its intent. Finally,
we explore a key implication of the psychological argument that ideology serves as a source of
uncertainty-reducing heuristics: namely, that ideology effects will disappear when ambiguity about
employee trustworthiness and effort-outcome linkages falls to zero.
Theory and Hypothesis Development
Political scientists often define ideologies as relatively stable, internally consistent belief
systems grounded in ontological assumptions about human nature and value-laden assumptions
about how to structure society (Knight, 2006). Since the French Revolution, philosophers and social
scientists have also posited that ideologies vary on a “left-right” dimension (Knight, 1999). Since
the classic work on the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford,
1950), psychologists have hypothesized that attitudes along this left-right axis serve a host of
epistemic, existential, and relational functions (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), which
lead conservatives (liberals) to be more (less) supportive of inequality, suspicious of human nature,
and punitive toward norm violators (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Jost, et al., 2009). Although the
“nurture” of life events plays a key role in shaping these bundles of attitudes, there is also evidence
for a “nature” effect: the ideologies of adults can be predicted with surprising accuracy from
nursery school behavior (Block & Block, 2006) and have replicable genetic and physiological
correlates (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Oxley et al., 2008; Westen, 2007).
In high-ambiguity situations (R. D. Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010), ideology can sway
accountability preferences via a variety of cognitive-affective pathways. First, there are clashing
ideological views of the trustworthiness of humanity in general and of various categories of human
beings in particular. Psychological work on ideology has long identified the liberal left with a view
of humanity as essentially good but corruptible by bad institutions—and identified the conservative
right with bleaker assessments of human nature that implies a need for strong institutions to check
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our natural depravity (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Costantini & Craik, 1980; McClelland, 1997;
Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986).
Insofar as liberal managers see human beings as more trustworthy, and feel more obligation
to protect those lower in status hierarchies (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2007), they will
prefer process-accountability systems that give employees more benefit of the doubt – and shield
them from being unjustly blamed for the uncontrollable. By contrast, insofar as conservative
managers see human beings as less trustworthy and see more need to protect institutions from free
riders, they will be more suspicious of process accountability—and worried about untrustworthy
employees creating façades of good faith (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977) that deflect skeptical
inquiries with hard-to-verify claims they are doing all that can be expected (Edelman, 1992;
Krawiec, 2004). In this view, conservative managers will be drawn to outcome accountability,
which they see as less easily gamed.
Second, ideologies influence views of how likely opposing attributional errors are and which
errors should be deemed most distasteful. Surveys suggest that liberals and conservatives view the
fundamental attribution error differently: liberals give greater weight to external causes beyond
individual control whereas conservatives attribute outcomes more to internal characteristics of the
individual (Tetlock, 2000; Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993; Tetlock et al., 2007). For instance,
conservatives are likelier to see hard work as tied to individual success and failure as tied to laziness
whereas liberals are likelier to see the effort-success links as easily severed by chance and
exogenous shocks (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). This may be why
there is sharp ideological disagreement over the social-safety-net statement, “It is the responsibility
of the government to take care of people who can’t take care of themselves” (Pew Research Center,
June 2012).
These results suggest that liberals’ proclivity toward external attributions is grounded in an
aversion to false-positive errors of holding people accountable for the uncontrollable—an aversion
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that will be most pronounced when there is uncertainty about how linked efforts and outcomes are.
Given that process accountability is often seen as reducing employees’ flexibility in choosing how
to pursue goals (Anderson & Oliver, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979), managers most
sensitive to false-positive errors will be most tolerant of this downside of process metrics.
Conservative managers, by contrast, will be less worried about false-positive errors because
they see success and effort as more tightly coupled. Instead, they will worry more about falsenegative errors: failing to hold employees accountable for outcomes they could have controlled.
Managers with these error-aversion priorities will be more tolerant of the downside risk of outcome
accountability, holding employees accountable for the uncontrollable (Gibbons, 1998).
This analysis leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. In situations where no information is available about employee trustworthiness and
effort-outcome links, conservative managers will prefer outcome accountability, and liberal
managers will prefer process accountability.
“No information” is, of course, an extreme limiting condition. Managers virtually always
know something. Moreover, managers often have opinions about organizational priorities that may
shape their views of appropriateness of process versus outcome accountability metrics. As noted
earlier, who advocates which metrics may well hinge on the relative salience of competing values in
efficiency-equality debates that erupt across policy domains 1 (Okun, 1975). Research on values and
ideology indicates that conservatives value market efficiency more, and equality less, than do
liberals (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Schwartz, 1996; Tetlock, 1986). Insofar as outcome
accountability systems are seen as harder to “game” (P.E. Tetlock & B.A. Mellers, 2011),

1

The efficiency-equality dimension parallels a key dimension of values in organizational behavior research: hierarchy
(stress on legitimacy of unequal distribution of power and resources) versus egalitarianism (stress on subordinating
individual interests to public welfare) (Schwartz, 1999). The hierarchy-egalitarianism dimension has been specifically
linked to managerial decisions and actions across a variety of cultural contexts (e.g., Smith, Peterson, & Schwartz,
2002). However, we use the efficiency-equality distinction because of its specific relevance to policy issues at the core
of the research design of Study 1.
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conservative managers should support such systems when efficiency is the foreground value and
liberal managers should support such systems when equality is the foreground value.
It follows that in domains in which efficiency values are salient—and equitable treatment of
employees fall into the perceptual background —Hypothesis 1 should continue to hold, or hold
even more strongly. In such domains (e.g., standardized test scores in public schools, profit margins
in private-sector firms), outcome accountability assures conservative managers that the focus is on
“getting the job done.” However, liberal managers are more sensitive to the unequal and often
arbitrary rewards and punishments that such systems can impose (Haidt, 2007; Napier & Jost, 2008)
– and are thus less supportive.
By contrast, we should expect a preference reversal in domains in which equality is the
salient value, such as EEO enforcement in workplaces– and efficiency is the background value.
Liberals have repeatedly been shown more enthusiastic about policies that favor helping historically
disadvantaged groups (Sniderman, Tetlock, & Carmines, 1993) – and more convinced of the
tenacity of racial prejudice (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). In designing accountability systems to
promote equal employment opportunity, these values and beliefs will predispose liberal managers to
favor outcome accountability that creates pressures to achieve numerical goals for hiring and
promoting underrepresented groups. This preference may be amplified by liberals’ concern that
prejudice remains an active force—and that process accountability can be too easily “gamed” by
personnel officers who claim compliance but continue to be soft on covert bias (Tetlock & Mitchell,
2009). And conservative managers will now be the skeptics of outcome metrics who worry about
adverse side effects on the new background value, efficiency. Conservatives will often view such
outcome-oriented systems as illegitimate equalizers in a game that should be played by purely
process-based, efficiency-promoting rules (Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin, 2004).
We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Context moderates the ideology-accountability relationship. (a) In efficiency-salient
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domains, conservative managers will prefer outcome and liberal managers will prefer process
accountability (consistent with Hypothesis 1). (b) In equality-salient domains, this preference will
reverse and conservative managers will prefer process accountability and liberal managers will
prefer, outcome accountability.
Thus far, our focus has been on de novo preferences—as if managers choose accountability
regimes with no benefit of historical experience of what worked before. However, rational-choice
proponents should expect ideology effects to vanish as soon as pragmatic managers have a chance
to adjust their initial accountability choices in response to employee reactions to those choices. Put
bluntly, economics will trump politics—and reality will trump ideology. This hypothesis has some
merit, but is based on the questionable assumption that history teaches unambiguous lessons about
which policies do and do not work—and why (March, 2010).
A counter-hypothesis, with roots in the bounded rationality tradition (Simon, 1955), is that
managers tend to learn only those lessons from history that they were already ideologically
predisposed to learn. According to the cognitive-dissonance principle of least effort (Abelson et al.,
1968; Jervis, 1976; Tetlock, 2005), managers cope with dissonant feedback by adjusting as few
cognitions as necessary. When confronted by dissonant evidence, conservatives and liberals alike
are at risk of motivated-reasoning effects (Kunda, 1999; Tetlock, 2005) that render them, in effect,
prisoners of their preconceptions. Thus, managers who initially prefer process or outcome
accountability and then discover that employees have subverted their preferred system will opt to
tinker on the margins by closing loopholes, not by adopting a system they initially disliked.
When they learn that employees failed to implement promised best-practices for checking
racial bias, conservative managers will not suddenly embrace outcome accountability in equalitysalient policy domains. Nor will liberals suddenly embrace outcome accountability in efficiencysalient domains when they discover that employees failed to implement promised processes. The
motivated reasoning literature tells us to expect each side to seize on the other’s failures as support
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for more radical reform. Conservative managers will seize on failures of process accountability in
efficiency-salient domains to argue for outcome accountability, and liberal managers will seize on
failures of process accountability in equality-salient domains to argue for outcome accountability. In
this view, we should expect shifting standards of evidence in the service of the dominant belief
system: use the failure of systems one dislikes as an argument for a new system but treat the failure
of systems one likes as an argument for refining ground rules. We thus propose H3 as an extension
of H2:
Hypothesis 3. Confronted by evidence their preferred system has been subverted, managers will
favor tinkering over switching. (a) For efficiency-salient policies, conservative managers will thus
favor tinkering with outcome metrics over switching to process accountability. (b) For equalitysalient policies, liberal managers will thus favor tinkering with outcome metrics over switching to
process accountability. (c) However, confronted by evidence that non-preferred systems have been
subverted, managers will prefer switching over tinkering.
Our theoretical arguments have thus far only been applied to domains in which either
managers know nothing about employee trustworthiness and effort-outcome linkages or managers
must rely on ideological schemas to compensate for the lack of direct knowledge about employees.
Our arguments imply, however, that when reliable, individuating information becomes available,
ideology will quickly lose its power to shape accountability preferences. When there is no
ambiguity on which motivated reasoning can operate, research on strong situations suggests that
context will trump individual differences (A. M. Grant & Rothbard, in press; House, Shane, &
Herold, 1996; Johns, 2006; R. D. Meyer, et al., 2010; Mischel, 1977)—and bipartisan consensus
will crystallize on the “right” forms of accountability.
As noted earlier, people often view process accountability as a kinder, gentler approach that
protects employees from false-positive attributions of responsibility, and outcome accountability as
removing this protection (P.E. Tetlock & B.A. Mellers, 2011). Research on organizational control
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systems warns, however, against assuming a necessary connection between one’s preferences for
process or outcome accountability and one’s views on whether the vagaries of effort-outcome links
should be borne by management or labor (Eisenhardt, 1985; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this
view, we should distinguish at least four categories of managerial options: generous and punitive
variants of process and outcome accountability.
(a) Opportunity-focused outcome accountability empowers employees to use their creativity
to go beyond standard operating routines and gives them chances to benefit from upside
uncertainties of effort-outcome links (A. M. Grant & Ashford, 2008; Simons, 2005, 2010).
(b) Punitive outcome accountability sends a no-excuses message to employees (Rodgers,
1993) and shifts the risk of uncertain effort-outcome linkages to employees (Williamson, 1991).
(c) Employee-protective process accountability rewards good faith effort and shifts the
downside risk of uncertain effort-outcome links from employees onto management (Scholten, van
Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2007; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), with potential benefits of
reducing stress and fear of mistakes and failure (Lee, Edmondson, Thomke, & Worline, 2004;
Schoemaker, 2011);
(d) Punitive process accountability increases monitoring of processes to prevent faking of
good-faith efforts and shifts the risk of uncertain effort-outcome links onto employees (Patil,
Vieider, & Tetlock, 2013).
Research on trust and fairness suggests that authorities tend to adopt punitive stances when
employees prove untrustworthy (Bushman, Baumeister, & Phillips, 2001; Kramer, 1999;
McAllister, 1995; Scott, Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009; Scott, Colquitt, & Zapata-Phelan, 2007). As
Ouchi (1979: 846) notes, “People must either be able to trust each other or to closely monitor each
other if they are to engage in cooperative enterprises.” However, when employees are trustworthy,
managers tend to form more communal bonds with them, and to be responsive to their personal
needs (Clark, Mills, & Powell, 1986; McAllister, 1995). This literature suggests that when there is
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trans-ideological consensus on the trustworthiness of employees, managers across the political
spectrum will be indifferent to process and outcome distinctions and endorse forms of
accountability that are emotionally congruent with their views of employees: tough, unforgiving
systems for the untrustworthy and generous, forgiving systems for the trustworthy (Axelrod, 1984).
Hypothesis 4: (a) When there is clear evidence of employee (un)trustworthiness, accountability
preferences will be guided not by ideological priors but rather by situation-specific information. (b)
Managers will prefer positive forms of both process and outcome accountability for employees
known to be trustworthy, and negative forms of both process and outcome accountability for
employees known to be untrustworthy.
This analysis suggests we should expect managers to endorse the most punitive forms of
both process or outcome accountability when employees are clearly untrustworthy and effortoutcome connections are clearly weak. The combination will enhance the attractiveness of
accountability systems that transfer risks from weak effort-outcome links to employees. When we
combine low trustworthiness and strong effort-outcome links, managers will still support punitive
forms of process and outcome accountability but the effects will shrink (it is, by definition,
impossible to transfer risks arising from uncertain effort-outcome links when there is zero
uncertainty about those links).
Hypothesis 5: Managers will display particularly strong preferences for punitive forms of both
process and outcome accountability when they see situation-specific evidence that employees are
untrustworthy and effort-outcome linkages are weak. The role of ideology will however be
diminished when such situation-specific evidence is available. Ideology will play no moderator
variable role.
We tested these five hypotheses in two studies of working managers. Study 1 examined the
effects of ideology on accountability preferences in domains in which there was either ambiguity
about, or controversy surrounding, employee trustworthiness and the tightness of effort-outcome
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links (Hypotheses 1-3). Study 2 eliminated ambiguity and controversy about employee
trustworthiness and effort-outcome links by directly manipulating both—and tested the power of
these manipulations to shape accountability preferences and to trump the influence of ideology
(Hypotheses 4-5).
Method
Study 1
Participants and Procedure
Seventy-five MBA students and executives in continuing-education courses participated in
class exercises on managerial choices. Participants ranged in age from 29 to 47 (average age of 34;
51 males and 24 females). Participants had, on average, six years of managerial experience (range
from 1 to 19) and held jobs with a median of 6 direct reports (range from 1 to 165). Participants
came mostly from technical backgrounds (75% engineering or physical and biological sciences;
25% other fields, including law, marketing, finance, and human resources). Three participants with
outlier profiles of responses (3-standard-deviation rule) were deleted.
The study involved three repeated-measure independent variables: (1) a high-ambiguity
(unspecified) organizational domain for measuring baseline accountability preferences; (2) an
efficiency-salient domain featuring an active political debate over the wisdom of adopting outcome
metrics (using standardized test scores to benchmark the performance of public school teachers); (3)
an equality-salient domain featuring an active political debate over the wisdom of outcome metrics
(using numerical goals to benchmark the EEO performance of personnel managers). We checked
the validity of the efficiency-equality characterizations of policy domains by obtaining ratings of an
expert panel (see next sub-section). Specifically, participants read the following three, orderrandomized scenarios:
(1) The unspecified or high-ambiguity organizational domain. The CEO of a large company
is considering two types of accountability systems for improving profitability, one known as process
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accountability and the other known as outcome accountability.
Process-accountability option: Advocates stress the need to hold employees responsible for
how they do their work and for implementing “best practices.” They say that it is essential to
ensure that employees are trying their hardest to accomplish key objectives—and a serious
demoralizing mistake to hold them accountable for achieving objectives that are just not
under their control.
Outcome-accountability option: Advocates stress the need to hold employees accountable
for what they actually accomplish. In this view, process accountability too often degenerates
into “going through the bureaucratic motions” of adopting formulaic best practices—and
failing to incentivize employees to take risks and initiatives essential to actually getting
things done.
(2) The efficiency-salient domain: Public schools. The School Board in a large school
district—at the 25th percentile for student achievement in its state— is considering one of two basic
types of accountability systems for improving performance: one known as process accountability
and the other known as outcome accountability.
Process-accountability option: Advocates propose to improve lagging student performance
by monitoring the quality of classroom instruction, using indicators such as experts’ ratings
of the curriculum and teacher performance in classrooms. The process-accountability
approach avoids the unfairness of outcome-accountability systems—that focus on student
standardized test performance and wind up rewarding or punishing teachers on the basis of
factors outside teachers’ control. Process-accountability also avoids the problem of
mechanical teaching to tests that can take the spontaneity and fun out of both learning and
teaching.
Outcome-accountability option: Advocates worry that the process approach fails to provide
tough, no-loophole checks on teacher unions and poor school administrators who are skilled
at saying the right things and pretending to adopt best practices but who are only interested
in feathering their own nests. They believe the real solution for lagging test scores is to
monitor student performance on standardized tests. This outcome-accountability approach
avoids the unfairness of “process-accountability systems”—that distract attention from the
key goal, student learning, and focus attention on the latest fads among education
researchers and reward schools for creating more bureaucracies designed to show how upto-date their teaching methods are.
(3) The equality-salient domain: EEO Enforcement. The CEO of a large company is
considering two types of accountability systems for checking racial discrimination: one known as
process accountability and the other known as outcome accountability.
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Process-accountability option: Advocates propose an evidence-based training program that
all managers who make personnel decisions must pass. The program is designed to ensure
that managers fully understand that all forms of discrimination are illegal, that they must
base their decisions solely on job-relevant performance, and that they need to be vigilant for
biases in their judgments. Managers also know that Human Resource professionals will
monitor all personnel decisions and hold managers accountable when they suspect bias.
Advocates say that it is the best way to guarantee fairness for all employees: judging
individual qualifications carefully and not resorting to quotas.
Outcome-accountability option: Advocates worry that process accountability is not powerful
enough to check widespread unconscious biases among managers who are skilled at saying
the right things and offering smooth justifications for decisions that may really be
discriminatory. Their outcome-accountability proposal requires careful studies of the
qualified labor-market pools for all jobs. Whenever there is a gap between the percentages of
African-Americans in a job and those in the qualified pool, managers are alerted to the
problem and told that a substantial fraction of their merit raises each year depends on
meeting numerical race-based goals for hiring and promotion.
Manipulation Checks to Ensure: (a) Policy Domains Were Efficiency- or Equality-Salient: (b)
Accountability Policy Options Captured the Process- and Outcome Distinction
We asked a panel of political scientists (n = 8) to rate on 9-point scales the degree to which
each outcome accountability policy proposal, described as presented to subjects, activated the
values of efficiency (“getting the designated job done as well as possible within cost constraints”)
or equality (“ensuring employees are treated fairly and equitably”). The scale anchors were: 1 =
efficiency/equality is the primarily activated value for proponents/skeptics of outcome
accountability; 9 = efficiency/equality is the secondarily activated value for proponents/skeptics of
outcome accountability; 5 = unsure). As expected, the outcome accountability proposal in the EEO
domain received pronounced primary value ratings on equality (M = 1.88, SE = .23) and secondary
value ratings on efficiency (M = 6.88, SE = .44), t(7) = -10.80, p < .01. The outcome accountability
proposal in the public-school domain received pronounced primary value ratings on efficiency (M =
7.50, SE = .50) and secondary value ratings on equality (M = 2.50, SE = .33), t(7) = 7.07, p < .01.
We also asked a larger group of raters, 167 business-school undergraduates recruited at a
private university on the East Coast, to judge how well each accountability policy option in each
domain captured the intended constructs of process and outcome accountability. They were
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randomly assigned to domains (n = 53 in unspecified domain; n = 56 in teacher domain; n = 58 in
EEO domain), and provided generic definitions of process and outcome accountability:
Outcome accountability: Under these systems, employees are evaluated on their ability to
obtain bottom-line results (e.g., profits in business; other bottom-line indicators in other
pursuits), but are not evaluated on the processes, procedures, or means they used to obtain
these bottom-line results.
Process accountability: Under these systems, employees are evaluated on the processes,
procedures, or means they used to obtain bottom-line results (e.g., adopting best practices),
but are not evaluated on whether they actually achieve the bottom-line results.
They were then presented, in randomized order, the process and outcome accountability
scenarios from a given domain and asked to rate each system on two unipolar 7-point Likert-type
scales (one ranging from “not at all describes process accountability” to “very much describes
process accountability” and the other from “not at all describes outcome accountability” to “very
much describes outcome accountability”). They also rated each system on a bipolar 7-point scale
(from “more closely resembles process accountability” to “more closely resembles outcome
accountability”). For each scenario, we collapsed the two unipolar ratings (coded towards the
outcome accountability end) and conducted paired-samples t-tests.
In the unspecified domain and on unipolar scales (α = .83), the process accountability
scenario was seen as more process (M = 1.82, SE = .16) and the outcome accountability scenario (α
= .82) as more outcome (M = 6.48, SE = .12), t (52) = -18.55, p < .01. This also held true for bipolar
ratings (process accountability (M = 1.92, SE = .23) vs. outcome accountability (M = 6.64, SE = .
09)), t (52) = -16.98, p < .01. The same patterns emerged in the public-school and EEO domains:
unipolar ratings of process accountability/public schools (α = .96) (M = 1.80, SE = .16) vs. outcome
accountability/public schools (α = .96) (M = 5.67, SE = .23), t (55) = -11.09, p < .01, bipolar
ratings of process accountability (M = 1.88, SE = .21) vs. outcome accountability (M = 5.55, SE = .
26), t (55) = -9.22, p < .01; unipolar ratings of process accountability/EEO (α = .94) (M = 2.84, SE
= .21) vs. outcome accountability/EEO (α = .93) (M = 5.55, SE = .19), t (57) = -8.54, p < .01;
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bipolar ratings of process accountability (M = 2.76, SE = .24) vs. outcome accountability (M =
5.72, SE = .19), t (57) = -8.44, p < .01.
Independent third-party ratings thus confirmed that our policy-domain choices captured the
target construct of efficiency-salience vs. equality-salience and that our scenarios captured the target
constructs of process vs. outcome accountability.
Political Ideology Measure
Prior to presenting scenarios, we measured ideological orientations with a 9-point selfidentification scale from the National Election Survey (Knight, 2006): managers indicated their
political views on a scale anchored at “strongly liberal” (1), “moderate” (5), and “strongly
conservative” (9). The left-right model of ideological structure has demonstrated strong theoretical
utility and test-retest reliability and validity (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Campbell, Converse, Miller, &
Strokes, 1960/1965; Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990; Jost, 2006;
Knight, 1999; Tomkins, 1963). Although there have been challenges to this bipolar measure of
ideology by those who argue that left and right represent two independent, unipolar dimensions
(Kerlinger, 1984), measures of liberalism and conservatism are rarely uncorrelated (Jost, et al.,
2009). The single-item measure has been validated in studies of nursery school behaviors in
predicting adult ideologies (Block & Block, 2006), the physiological basis of ideologies (Oxley, et
al., 2008; Westen, 2007), and heritability estimates in the range of 50% (Alford, et al., 2005).
Dependent Variables
Participants indicated their preference for accountability systems on two 9-point Likert-type
unipolar scales, measuring preferences for weak or strong forms of process and outcome
accountability, separately (1= preference for no accountability; 5 = moderate accountability; 9 =
preference for intense accountability). They also rated their preferences on a bipolar scale, from
pure process accountability (1) to pure outcome accountability (9). We deployed both types of
scales because there were no research precedents to guide us and a good deal of uncertainty about
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which measurement model better mapped onto our subjects’ mental models of accountability:
(a) A single bipolar dimension. In this view, managers tacitly assume that it is possible to
have only so much accountability and they see choices between process and outcome as falling
along a continuum of forced trade-offs: support for process accountability must fall as support for
outcome accountability rises—and vice versa. The endpoints are defined by pure-process and
outcome ideal types—and the midpoint by hybrid accountability (balanced-scorecard) efforts to
strike compromises that build on the perceived strengths and compensate for the perceived
weaknesses of each ideal type. This bipolar model has the advantage of capturing the either-or,
hydraulic dynamics of many policy debates but the disadvantage of failing to capture all possible
positions that thoughtful observers want to stake out. The midpoint cannot distinguish those who
believe it possible to mix strong forms of both process and outcome accountability from those who
believe it possible to mix only weak or moderate versions of each. The bipolar scale also offers no
home for those who think that employees are over-monitored—and there is simply too much of
both process and outcome accountability;
(b) Two unipolar dimensions. In this view, managers do not assume there is a fixed upper
bound value on accountability. They see choices between process and outcome as falling along two
distinct, perhaps orthogonal, unipolar dimensions, the first anchored by no-process accountability at
one end and strong process-accountability at the other, and the second anchored by no-outcome
accountability at one end and strong outcome-accountability at the other. This wider measurement
net allows us to “catch” otherwise elusive mindsets of would-be organizational designers: those
who think it feasible to implement more of both process and outcome accountability and those who
worry about too much monitoring and recommend less of both.
Follow-Up Study Design and Measures
In a follow-up session three weeks later, we reminded managers of their original choices and
asked them, in a role-playing task, how much they would change their minds about the right balance
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between process and outcome accountability if they had been in charge and discovered that
employees were gaming the system (six participants were lost due to absences, reducing the sample
size to 66). Participants were assigned to a mixed design factorial. In the between-subjects part, half
role-played managers in the corporate-EEO domain; the other half did so in the public school
domain. In the repeated-measures part, they saw two scenarios (order counterbalanced): those in
charge had adopted outcome (or process) accountability and a problem had arisen. Employees had
found ways to subvert the system.
In the outcome-accountability scenario, managers indicated on a 9-point Likert-type scale
their preferred countermeasure, anchored on one end by (a) developing better outcome metrics of
bottom-line performance that are harder to fake, and on the other by (b) moving from outcome
accountability toward process accountability metrics that focus more on actual employee behavior
than on bottom-line performance. In the process accountability scenario, managers indicated on a 9point Likert-type scale their preferred countermeasure, anchored on one end by (a) developing
better process metrics of employee behavior that are harder to fake, and on the other by (b) moving
from process accountability toward outcome accountability metrics that focus on bottom-line
performance more than actual employee behavior.
Results
Table 1 presents all means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations, by
organizational domain. Table 2 presents all regression analysis coefficients and test statistics. 2
2

Study 1 also included measures of participants’ trust in the relevant role incumbents (public school
teachers and EEO officers) (9-point Likert scale: 1 = “no trust”; 9 = “completely trust”) and concern for under
attribution errors [under-estimating employees’ control over important outcomes (9-point Likert scale: 1 = extremely
rare; 5 = moderately common; 9 = extremely common)]. Mediation analyses with these two variables did not yield
significant results but there were substantial correlations in the predicted directions. In the public school domain,
ideology was correlated with trust (r = -.39, p < .01), with conservatives trusting teachers less. Trust was,
in turn, negatively correlated with preference for outcome accountability (r = -.53, p < .01). Ideology was also
correlated with attribution-error aversion (r = .48, p < .01), with conservatives more averse to under
estimating teachers’ control over student performance. Aversion to this error was, in turn, positively correlated with
preference for outcome accountability (r = .55, p < .01).In the EEO domain, ideology was also correlated
with trust (r = .60, p < .01), with conservatives trusting personnel managers more; trust was, in turn, negatively
correlated with preference for outcome accountability (r = -.51, p < .01). Conservative ideology was also negatively
correlated with concern for under-attribution errors (r = -.56, p < .01), and concern for these errors was positively
correlated with endorsing outcome accountability (r = .65, p < .01).
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Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 involved a series of regressions of accountability preferences on
ideology. Although there were good conceptual grounds for measuring accountability preferences
using both unipolar and bipolar scales, the two types of scales had strikingly similar functional
relationships with the independent variables – so, to simplify presentation, we report only the
bipolar scales here (Table 2 does however include unipolar results).
In the unspecified domain, consistent with Hypothesis 1, liberal managers were likelier to
support process measures, and conservative managers to support outcome measures, F(1, 74) =
23.62, p < .01. For the public school domain, the same relationship emerged, F(1, 74) = 19.98, p < .
01: conservative managers were more supportive of outcome systems and liberal managers more
supportive of process systems. Thus, in the efficiency-salient domain, the pattern predicted by
Hypothesis 1 was confirmed (as predicted by Hypothesis 2a). Also, consistent with Hypothesis 2b,
we found a reversal of these preferences in the EEO (equality-salient) domain: conservative
managers were likelier to support process systems and liberal managers likelier to support outcome
systems, F(1, 74) = 34.55, p < .01.
To test Hypotheses 3a-c, we conducted a series of regression analyses for each domain and
system being subverted. In the public-school domain, liberal managers were likelier than
conservative managers to switch to process accountability when they learned that outcome
accountability had been subverted (b = -.48, s.e. = .20, t = 2.36, p < .05). But conservative managers
were likelier than liberal managers to switch to outcome accountability when they learned that
process accountability had been subverted (b = .63, s.e. = .16, t = 3.98, p < .01).
In the EEO domain, conservative managers were likelier than liberal managers to favor
switching to process accountability systems when the outcome accountability system had been
subverted (b = .41, s.e. = .14, t = 2.93, p < .01). However, they were less likely than liberal
managers to favor switching to outcome accountability when they were informed that process
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accountability had been subverted (b = -.51, s.e. = .23, t = 2.42, p < .05).
Table 3 presents two sets of regressions that show what happens when we combine the
public-school and corporate EEO data and test the interaction hypotheses. Managers prefer to (a)
tinker with malfunctioning preferred systems (e.g., for liberal observers, process systems in
schools/outcome systems for corporate EEO; for conservatives, process systems in corporate EEO
and outcome systems in schools) (supporting Hypotheses 3a-b); and, (b) abandon malfunctioning
non-preferred systems (Hypothesis 3c). In each case the interaction was significant. To facilitate the
interpretation of the interaction, we plotted the simple slopes of preferences to switch to the
alternate accountability system at one standard deviation above and below the mean of ideology
ratings (as recommended by Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 1 plots the results. The accompanying
statistical comparison of these slopes to zero strongly supported Hypotheses 3a-c.
Discussion
Political ideology was a robust predictor of accountability preferences, but the direction
shifted predictably across domains. In the high-ambiguity baseline domain, conservative managers
preferred outcome accountability. But liberal and conservative managers traded places in
accountability-design debates in the public-school domain and the corporate EEO domain.
As predicted for public schools, liberal managers favored process accountability that used
best practice indicators to evaluate the quality of instruction in classrooms. Conservative managers
favored outcome accountability that required schools to improve test scores. In the free-response
section of our study where participants could express their thoughts on the pros and cons of process
vs. outcome accountability in each domain, there were informal signs of conservative efforts to
delegitimize process accountability and liberal efforts to delegitimize outcome accountability. For
example, one conservative said he had little faith in the ability of the “bureaucrats” and “unions” to
deliver “quality education to kids.” Another added: “If you want results, you have to pull their feet
to the fire. We care about what children are learning and tests are the best way to find out if they
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are.” By contrast, liberals worried about good teachers being labeled bad because they had been
assigned “difficult classes” and worried about bad teachers being tempted to teach the test. One
liberal wrote: “We have to treat teachers as professionals who know best how to evaluate their
colleagues.”
This pattern reversed in the EEO realm. Here conservative managers favored process
accountability, whereas liberal managers favored outcome accountability that mandated numerical
goals for minority hiring and promotion. Informal comments may shed some light on these patterns.
Liberal managers were explicitly skeptical of pure process metrics that made no reference to
numerical goals: “I need to see the numbers. I know we (people at his company) are capable of
doing a lot more on the diversity front.” and “I know people pay a lot of lip service to diversity but
when I look at the faces at the top, I’m afraid I don’t trust their hearts (are) in this.” In effect, both
participants were saying that as long as current demographic inequalities persisted, they would
doubt the fairness of process-accountability systems. By contrast, conservative managers preferred
process-accountability, even when those systems failed to eliminate disparate impact, which the
strongest conservatives attributed to pre-existing differences in human capital, not discrimination.
They doubted the fairness and efficiency of outcome-accountability: “It’s not fair to ask individual
companies to clean up the after-effects of society’s failures—there often are not enough qualified
minorities” and “Outcome accountability is a fancy name for quotas—and quotas violate my sense
of fairness.”
The responses to the “would-you-change-your-mind?” questions also reinforce how easy it
is to become a prisoner of one’s ideological preconceptions in these domain-specific challenges –
and how hard it is to persuade managers, locked into an ideological view of the agents and of the
right error-aversion priorities, to reconsider their accountability-system preferences in light of
evidence that employees are subverting their initially preferred system.
Finally, it is worth noting that our analysis assumes neither that the values of equality and
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efficiency always clash (pull people in opposing policy directions) nor that these values exhaust the
set of values likely to influence managerial decisions on how to design accountability systems. Our
claims are modest: (1) when managers think about how to structure accountability systems in
particular domains, the spotlight for some managers seems to be more on "getting the job done" and
for others, more on treating employees equally/preventing prejudice; (2) which managers fall in
which categories is a joint function of ideological outlook and the degree to which the work setting
has become a focal point for policy debates (“politicization”).
There is a methodological trade-off between ecological realism and internal validity here. In
principle, one could create completely fictional work situations (as we do in Study 2), toward which
respondents would have had zero ideological sympathies or antipathies. But we opted in Study 1 to
use pre-existing real-world groups toward which liberals and conservatives harbor a variety of
value-laden associations. The connection between abstract values, such as efficiency and equality
and specific policy preferences is inevitably somewhat loose – and hinges on the specific causal
assumptions that respondents make about which policies will have which impact on which groups.
It is easy to imagine people who endorse outcome accountability for teachers because they care
about promoting equality of opportunity for students—or, for that matter, people who endorse
process accountability in EEO efforts because they care about equality of opportunity. The pattern
of ideological correlates in Study 1 suggests however that this was not the dominant driver of such
support in this sample at this juncture in history.
Study 2
As noted earlier, our predictions about the effects of ideology on accountability preferences
rest on the assumption that managers confront a situation in which (a) the trustworthiness of
employees is unknown or difficult to gauge and (b) there is no information about the reliability of
the effort-outcome linkage. In Study 2, we test Hypotheses 4 and 5 by exploring whether ideology
effects completely disappear in experimental conditions that eliminate the usual real-world
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uncertainties about employee trustworthiness and effort-outcome reliability—and that disentangle
prior real-world associations respondents may have between soft and hard accountability and
process and outcome accountability.
Participants and Procedure
Seventy-two executive MBA students participated in this study. The average age was 34.1
years and 22 were female.
The study was a factorial design with two between-subjects independent variables (high vs.
low trustworthiness and low vs. high effort-outcome links) and two sets of dependent variables to
capture the positive vs. negative evaluative framing of process vs. outcome accountability systems.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four between-subjects groups.
Research has identified benevolence—the extent to which a trustee is believed to have
concern for and commitment to the trustor and his or her interests (beyond egocentric profit
motives)—as a central dimension of trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). As such,
we manipulated perceived trustworthiness by varying information about employees’ motives and
attachment to the company.
In the low-trustworthiness condition, participants read that:
“Most employees at company XX appear to have the goal of being paid as much as possible
for doing as little as possible.”
Subjects in the high-trustworthiness condition learned that:
“Most employees at Company XX appear to be deeply committed to advancing the
productivity and profitability of the company.”
Subjects assigned to the high reliability of effort-outcome linkage condition were told that:
“Chance plays little role at company XX in determining the connection between how hard
employees work and the quality of the end products of their efforts. Employees who work
hard and follow prescribed processes can be reasonably confident that the final outcomes of
their efforts will advance the profitability of the company.”
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In the low reliability of effort-outcome linkage, participants read that:
“Chance plays a substantial role at company XX in determining the connection between how
hard employees work and the quality of the end products of their efforts. Employees who
work hard and follow prescribed processes cannot be certain that the final outcomes of their
efforts will advance the profitability of the company.”
All participants rated their approval of four different accountability systems (presented as two
repeated-measures). The four combinations read as follows:
(a) Positive evaluative spin on outcome accountability: “A system that gives employees a
chance to benefit from the upside risk of any uncertainty in the effort-outcome connection
by exercising their creativity and exploring new processes that improve bottom-line
productivity”;
(b) Negative evaluative spin on outcome accountability: “A system that transfers the
downside risk of any uncertainty in the effort-outcome connection onto the employees (the
rationale being the need to communicate to employees that they cannot hide low-effort
inputs by invoking the excuse that the connections between effort and outcome are
uncertain)”;
(c ) Positive evaluative spin on process accountability: “A system that ensures that
employees who do their jobs well will always be rewarded, despite any uncertainty that
might exist in the effort-outcome connection (the rationale being the need to show
employees that the company values their efforts, even when those efforts do not reliably
translate into positive outcomes)”;
(d) Negative evaluative spin on process accountability: “A system that protects the
organization from the downside risk of any uncertainty in the effort-outcome connection (the
rationale being the need to communicate to employees that they cannot hide low-effort
inputs by invoking the excuse that the connections between effort and outcome are
uncertain).”
Measures
As in Study 1, prior to presenting accountability systems, we measured managers’ political
ideologies with a 9-point self-identification scale from the National Election Survey (Knight, 2006):
managers were asked to indicate their political views on a scale anchored at “strongly liberal” (1),
“moderate” (5), and “strongly conservative” (9).
For the dependent variable, participants rated the strength of the arguments for
implementing accountability systems in four different ways on a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging
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from 1 (“disagree”) to 9 (“agree”), with 5 indicating “neutrality.”
Results
Table 4 reports the means and standard deviations for each between-subject condition.
Hypothesis 4 stated that (a) when there is clear evidence of employee (un)trustworthiness,
accountability preferences will be guided not by ideological priors but rather by situation-specific
information; and, (b) managers will prefer positive forms of both process and outcome
accountability for employees known to be trustworthy, and negative forms of both process and
outcome accountability for employees known to be untrustworthy. To test Hypothesis 4a, we ran
regression analyses and to test 4b, we ran a mixed design analysis of variance.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4a, regression analyses revealed no significant relationships of
ideology with endorsements of negative-spin outcome accountability, F(1, 71) = .002, ns., positivespin outcome accountability, F(1, 71) = .01, ns, negative-spin process accountability, F(1, 71) =
2.33, p > .10, and positive-spin process accountability, F(1, 71) = .17, ns.
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of trust, F(1, 68) = 143.25, p < .001. When managers
thought employees were trustworthy, they preferred positive (M = 6.82, SE = .13) over negative (M
= 3.53, SE = .20) forms of accountability, t (71) = 9.54, p < .01, but when employees were
untrustworthy, they preferred negative (M = 6.25, SE = .17) to positive (M = 4.21, SE = .26) forms
of accountability, t (71) = 5.36, p < .01. Also, form of accountability no longer had a significant
effect, F (1, 68) = 3.54, p > .05, suggesting that managers were indifferent to whether the evaluative
spins involved process or outcome accountability. Thus, Hypothesis 4b was fully supported. Figure
2 plots the estimated marginal means of this interaction.
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between trust
and effort-outcome linkage on evaluative spin, F (1, 68) = 10.22, p < .01. Contrast plots show that,
when there was uncertainty about employees’ ability to achieve outcomes via good-faith effort,
managers exhibited the pattern in Hypothesis 4. For trustworthy employees, managers preferred
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positive (M = 7.25, SE = .18) to negative (M = 3.81, SE = .27) forms of accountability, t(35) = 8.77,
p < .01, but for untrustworthy employees, they preferred negative (M = 7.08, SE = .21) to positive
forms (M = 4.25, SE = .31), t(35) = 7.14, p < .01.
Also consistent with Hypothesis 5, a similar, albeit weaker, pattern emerged when there was
low uncertainty about employees’ ability to achieve desired outcomes. For untrustworthy
employees, managers preferred negative (M = 5.42, SE = .14) to positive (M = 4.17, SE = .28)
forms of accountability, t (35) = 4.03, p < .01; for trustworthy employees, managers preferred
positive (M = 6.38, SE = .16) to negative (M = 3.25, SE = .26) forms of accountability, t(35) = 8.95,
p < .01. But there was a statistically significant difference, t(35) = 6.53, p < .01, between
managerial support for negative forms of accountability when the effort-outcome linkage was
unreliable (M = 7.08, SE = .24) vs. reliable (M = 5.09, SE = .14). Managers were especially
supportive of punitive process and outcome accountability when there was low effort-outcome
linkage.
Accountability type did not play a moderator-variable role, F (1, 68) = .64, p > .10,
suggesting that participants ceased to care about the distinction between process and outcome
accountability. Figure 3 plots the estimated marginal means of the three-way interaction.
Discussion
Ideology and type of accountability (process versus outcome) explained significant fractions
of the variance in managerial reactions in Study 1—and negligible fractions of the variance in Study
2. This pattern across studies reinforces the theoretical argument that ideology predicts
accountability preferences only when managers operate in high-ambiguity or high-controversy
worlds. Ideology has no uncertainty-reducing role to play when, as in Study 2, there was no
uncertainty about the trustworthiness of employees and the tightness of effort-outcome linkages.
Study 2 also shows it is possible to disentangle the value-laden associations that are often
attached to process and outcome accountability in real-world controversies. Process accountability
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need not mean a kinder, gentler form of accountability designed to protect employees from a
stochastic work world; it can also be intrusive, suspicious, and heavy-handed. And outcome
accountability need not mean a nasty Darwinian form of accountability that transfers risk onto the
employees; it can be liberating and challenging. In real-world political debate, however, this
malleability of meaning is often hard to observe because the debaters are under both cognitivedissonance and impression-management pressures to engage in belief-system overkill (Jervis, 1976;
Tetlock & Manstead, 1985) – and to define the option space in ways that reinforce their preferred
stance. If one’s “side” is on record as favoring no-nonsense outcome accountability for a festering
problem – be it low minority representation in corporate jobs or low-performing public schools –
loyal partisans on one’s side of the ideological divide should mobilize the necessary arguments to
prevail (e.g., depicting employees as untrustworthy—and stressing how much better outcomes
could be if only the employees would ‘really try’).
However, managers are also accountable to market realities, and ideological justifications
for accountability systems often sound shrill and close-minded. Managers thus have to balance
theory-driven information processing (essential to fill in the blanks when there is ambiguity) and
data-driven processing (essential to be responsive to compelling context-specific evidence of how
trustworthy employees are and how tightly coupled employee inputs and outputs are). Study 2
showed that, when this individuating information becomes available, ideological polarization
evaporates, as does the linkage between seeing employees as untrustworthy and preferring outcome
accountability. Managers simply want forms of accountability – be they process or outcome – that
protect their organizations from employees who cannot be trusted and that protect and reward
employees who can be trusted. And managers adopt a particularly tough stance toward
untrustworthy employees when effort-outcome linkages are unreliable.
There is nothing inherently oppressive about outcome accountability – or permissive about
process accountability. Outcome accountability, when framed as opportunity expansion, can be cast
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as a catalyst to creativity, not a squelcher (Simons, 2010) – and process accountability, when framed
as loss aversion, can be cast as an essential check on untrustworthy employees, not as an openended invitation to invent excuses for low output (P.E. Tetlock & B.A. Mellers, 2011).
General Discussion
Management scholars have noted that the big-picture question of how accountability
systems emerge in organizations—and the factors that influence choices of systems – remains
largely unexplored (as recommended by Aldrich, 1999; Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2004; Kimberly,
1979). Our research contributes to filling this gap by treating ideology as a source of uncertaintyreducing heuristics—and by examining the interplay between ideology and organizational domains
in shaping when and why managers favor certain accountability systems.
Our data suggest that when little is known about the trustworthiness of employees and the
reliability of input-output connections, managers rely on ideologies for simplifying heuristics in
appraising the risks and benefits of accountability systems. Among other things, ideology offers
guidance in estimating the trustworthiness of employees, in judging the degree to which employees
could control key outcomes if they really tried, and in gauging which inferential mistakes it is better
or worse to make.
However, the direction of the correlations between ideology and accountability preferences
shifts across domains. Such findings place a key qualification on the work of Tetlock (2000).
Conservatives may be inherently suspicious of human nature and – rightly or wrongly – see
outcome accountability as harder to game. They may also be more sensitive to false-attribution
errors of failing to hold employees accountable for outcomes they could have controlled. However,
conservative and liberal managers readily switch places in accountability-design debates as a
function of whose core ideological values are at stake in the policy mission. The data also supported
the prisoners-of-our-preconceptions hypothesis: managers only tinkered with their initially
preferred accountability systems in response to evidence of cheating but abandoned their initially
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less preferred systems in response to the same evidence of cheating.
The consequences of managerial reliance on ideologically-driven preferences in lowinformation or ambiguous settings are substantial. In holding employees accountable for outcomes
when the effort-outcome linkage is weak, managers run the risk of triggering perverse reactions. For
example, salespeople struggling to hit sales targets can engage in corner-cutting when it comes to
customer service, undermining the organization’s relationship with a key stakeholder (Gibbons,
1998). In a CEO-simulation in which performance-based incentives purely focused on outcomes,
Lefebvre and Vieider (2010) showed that the net result was excessive risk-taking among executives.
In such instances of low effort-outcome reliability, process accountability may relieve managers of
achieving outcomes they can only partially influence (R. M. Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
However, managerial support for process accountability also runs the risk of infusing
unnecessary subjectivity into personnel evaluation (Anderson & Oliver, 1987). In eliminating the
inequities linked to simple outcome metrics, managers may choose process measures that
inadvertently create new inequities (Tetlock & Mitchell, 2009). From a procedural-justice
perspective, managers may be prone to a host of biases when they evaluate employees’ complex
records (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Under such process systems, internal managers
have wide latitude in imposing their own ideas of which behaviors lead to valued results – a
situation likely to engender debates about the utility and fairness of the processes that have been
anointed as worth monitoring. Additionally, there is the risk of process accountability degenerating
into bureaucratic ritualism and symbolic compliance (Edelman, 1992).
These risks do not disappear when managers have accurate case-specific evidence about the
trustworthiness of their employees and the relationship between employee efforts and outcomes –
and can stop relying on ideological heuristics. Substantial bodies of work demonstrate that people
react negatively to control systems that depict them as lazy or incompetent (Enzle & Anderson,
1993; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007; Sutton & Galunic, 1996). Continuing to treat the
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untrustworthy as untrustworthy via punitive variants of process or outcome accountability (as
managers in Study 2 opted to do) may result in even more untrustworthy behaviors (Malhotra &
Murnighan, 2002), creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Arguably, these effects would be further
enhanced when there is weak effort-outcome reliability (again, Study 2 managers preferred this
solution – i.e., imposing punitive oversight especially in low effort-outcome conditions for those
labeled untrustworthy). On the other end, managers do not necessarily inoculate themselves against
adverse effects when they embrace the more positive forms of process or outcome accountability –
here they can fall prey to the “sucker” effect, and continue to trust those who might turn out most
willing and able to shirk (Fehr & Schmidt, 2007).
Finally, it is possible that the current results exaggerate the power of ideology because we
measured ideology at the start of the session in which we assessed initial accountability preferences.
We cannot rule out that some associative priming may have occurred, but we do not see such an
effect as a serious threat to the theoretical and practical significance of the results. From a
theoretical perspective, an ideology-priming effect could account for the findings only if
respondents already had the same associations we hypothesized between liberalism-conservatism
and perceptions of workforces in public schools and corporate America. And although a priming
interpretation could reduce the generalizability of our results (limiting them to situations in which
people have just been reminded of their political views), public opinion research suggests that value
priming and issue framing are common influence tactics in real-world debates. When activists try to
mobilize their “base” on an issue, they often do so by exhorting their fellow citizens to make the
“right” cognitive connections between grand abstractions (party affiliation, ideology) and the
concrete issue at hand (Druckman, 2001, 2004; Sniderman, 2000). The job of activists is to nudge
or even shove the non-activist, sympathetic public into a correct initial position.
In sum, when managers opt for certain accountability systems over others, they expose
themselves and their organizations to complex mixes of risks. Ideology can simplify these trade-
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offs, but the price of simplification can be steep.
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TABLE 1
Study 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations by Domain
Unspecified Domain:
Variable
1. Political
ideology
2. Process
accountability
support (unipolar)
3. Outcome
accountability
support (unipolar)
4. Process vs.
outcome
accountability
support (bipolar)
Public School Domain:
Variable
1. Political
ideology
2. Process
accountability
support (unipolar)
3. Outcome
accountability
support (unipolar)
4. Process vs.
outcome
accountability
support (bipolar)

M
5.10

SD
1.55

1
1.00

2

3

4

5.40

.96

-.22

1.00

5.57

.80

.32**

-.08

1.00

5.17

1.07

.60**

-.27*

.65**

1.00

M
5.10

SD
1.55

1
1.00

2

3

4

5.13

1.11

-.33**

1.00

5.88

1.22

.52**

.61**

1.00

5.33

.93

.55**

-.64**

.77**

1.00
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Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Domain:
Variable
M
1. Political
5.10
ideology
2. Process
5.85
accountability
support (unipolar)
3. Outcome
5.00
accountability
support (unipolar)
4. Process vs.
4.81
outcome
accountability
support (bipolar)
Change in Accountability Preferences:
Variable
1. Political ideology
2. Switch preferences (when outcome system subverted)
3. Switch preferences (when process system subverted)
Notes. * p < .05; ** p < .01.

SD
1.55

1
1.00

2

1.25

.37*

1.00

1.44

-.46**

-.51**

1.00

1.16

-.61**

-.50**

.74**

SD
1.55
1.17
1.40

3

4

1.00

2

3

1.00
-.09

1.00
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TABLE 2
Study 1 Regression Analyses by Domain
Unspecified Domain:
Process
Account
ability
(Unipol
ar)
Age
Gender
Ideology

B
.01
.19
-.13

Outcom
e
Account
ability
(Unipol
ar)
SE
.03
.22
.07

Public School Domain:
Process Outcom
Account
e
ability
Account
(Unipol
ability
ar)
(Unipol
ar)
B
SE
Age
.02
.04
Gender
.19
.28
Ideology
-.24
.09

Process-Outcome Accountability (Bipolar)

β
.05
.10
-.22

T
.41
.84
-1.89*

B
-.03
-.23
.21

SE
.03
.22
.07

β
-.09
-.12
.35

t
-.78
-1.03
3.07*
*

B
-.01
-.24
.40

SE
.04
.24
.08

β
-.03
-.12
.63

t
-.27
-.97
5.116**

SE
.03
.23
.06

β
.17
-.05
.57

t
1.43
-.45
4.81***

Process-Outcome Accountability (Bipolar)

β
-.07
.08
-.33

T
-.59
.69
-2.47**

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Domain:
Process Outcom

B
.08
-.01
.39

SE
.04
.30
.09

β
.21
.00
.54

t
1.77
-.03
4.21***

B
.05
-.10
.29

Process-Outcome Accountability (Bipolar)
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Account
ability
(Unipol
ar)
Age
Gender
Ideology

B
-.05
.13
.32

e
Account
ability
(Unipol
ar)
SE
.05
.31
.10

β
-.13
.05
.40

Notes. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

T
-1.10
.43
3.12*
**

B
.07
-.18
-.45

SE
.05
.35
.11

β
.15
-.06
-.49

t
1.30
-.52
-4.14***

B
.02
.13
-.49

SE
.04
.29
.11

β
.06
.05
-.66

t
.51
.45
-4.28***
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TABLE 3
Regression Coefficients for Ideology x Domain Interactions on Preferences for Switching Accountability Systems

DV: Preferences for Switching to Process Accountability Systems when Outcome Accountability System
Subverted
B
SE
Β
T
Ideology

-.58

.27

-.78

-2.16*

Domain

-2.95

.91

-1.26

-3.25**

.50

.17

1.45

2.95**

Ideology x Domain

DV: Preferences for Switching to Outcome Accountability Systems when Process Accountability System
Subverted
B
SE
Β
T
Ideology

1.91

.34

2.12

5.71**

Domain

5.82

.93

2.01

6.03**

Ideology x Domain

-1.13

.19

-2.54

-5.92**

Notes. * p < .05; ** p < .01
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TABLE 4
Study 2 Means and Standard Deviations by Condition
Condition
Low trustworthiness, low
effort-outcome reliability
(n = 18)
Low trustworthiness, high
effort-outcome reliability
(n = 18)
High trustworthiness, high
effort-outcome reliability
(n = 18)
High trustworthiness, low
effort-outcome reliability
(n = 18 )

Negative Evaluative
Form of Outcome
Accountability
7.00

Positive Evaluative Form
of Outcome
Accountability
3.78

Negative Evaluative
Form of Process
Accountability
7.17

Positive Evaluative Form
of Process Accountability

(1.46)

(1.44)

(1.04)

(1.13)

5.22

4.89

5.61

3.44

(.94)

(.96)

(.70)

(1.15)

3.06

6.44

3.44

6.33

(.94)

(.92)

(1.15)

(1.03)

4.11

6.89

3.50

7.61

(1.64)

(1.08)

(1.04)

(1.01)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

4.72
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FIGURE 1
Simple Slopes for Ideology x Domain Interaction Effects on Preferences for Switching Accountability Systems

Preferences for Switching to Process Accountability Systems when
Outcome Accountability System Subverted

Preferences for Switching to Outcome Accountability Systems when
Process Accountability System Subverted
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FIGURE 2
Study 2 Estimated Marginal Mean Plots of Trust x Evaluative Spin Interaction
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FIGURE 3
Study 2 Estimated Marginal Mean Plots of Trust x Effort-Outcome Reliability x Evaluative Spin Interaction
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